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COULD DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES LEAD TO
AN INCREASE IN STOCKHOLDER-APPROVED
MERGERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY AN INCREASE
IN EXERCISE OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS?
ALYSON BROWN
ABSTRACT
Blockchain, the distributed ledger technology underlying
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, is poised to revolutionize industries
and processes across disciplines. In particular, government agencies and companies are looking for ways to leverage blockchain’s
efficiencies to facilitate safe record-keeping. Municipalities are employing blockchain-issued deeds to accurately record property ownership. Progressive legal professionals are employing blockchainissued “smart-contracts” to more accurately record contract terms.
Intellectual property attorneys and related government agencies
are researching blockchain-issued copyrights and patents.
This Note examines how utilizing blockchain technology in
securities trading to maintain accurate stockholder ledgers will
allow for current market forces to be reflected in stockholder voting.
Further, this Note seeks to address how blockchain-issued shares
of stock could affect stockholder approved mergers and the exercise
of appraisal rights. This Note posits that accurate stockholder ledgers will lead to an increase in stockholder approved mergers, but
will not have an effect on the exercise of appraisal rights.

JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2019. BA Business
Administration, North Carolina State University, Class of 2016. The author
would like to thank her parents, Karen and Percell Brown, for their unconditional love and support in all of her academic pursuits.

781

782 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:781
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 783
I. BLOCKCHAIN GENERALLY ........................................................ 786
II. BLOCKCHAIN & CORPORATE RECORD-KEEPING ...................... 787
A. Corporate Record-Keeping Requirements ......................... 789
B. Increased Accuracy Using Blockchain .............................. 790
III. BLOCKCHAIN & STOCK TRADING ........................................... 791
A. Delaware’s Implementation of Blockchain Technology .... 791
IV. ACCURATE STOCKHOLDER LISTS & MERGER APPROVALS ...... 793
A. X Stockholders ................................................................... 797
B. Y Stockholders ................................................................... 798
C. Z Stockholders ................................................................... 800
D. Merger Approval ................................................................ 803
E. Exercise of Appraisal Rights ............................................. 804
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 805

2019]

DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES

783

INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto created a database of distributed ledgers leveraging peer-to-peer technology that now operates
the popular cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.1 In the decade since Nakamoto’s use of distributed ledgers for cryptocurrency, legal scholars
have researched the implications of blockchain technology in the
finance, securities, and copyright industries.2 “Blockchain technology”, as used in this Note, refers to a “distributed ... ledger that,
when combined with a digital transaction validation process, allows
for the peer-to-peer electronic transfer of an asset without the
need for an intermediary.”3
This Note seeks to explore how blockchain technology can
revolutionize stock trading, focusing on the use of Distributed
Ledger Shares (“DLS”) to increase the accuracy of a corporation’s
stock ledger. Specifically, this Note concentrates on the effects of
stock ledger accuracy on stockholder-voted mergers and appraisal
right assertion. Part I provides a brief overview of blockchain
technology generally. Part II explores corporate record-keeping
requirements. Specifically, it explains how the advantages of blockchain technology can be leveraged to greatly reduce inaccuracies
in corporation’s stock ledgers. Part III details the tangible advantages of blockchain technology and outlines how Delaware plans
to capitalize on these efficiencies in stock trading. Next, Part IV
introduces the governing state and federal law for obtaining stockholder approval for mergers and other corporation reorganizations, as well as dissenting stockholder appraisal rights. Further,
Part IV argues that increased accuracy in stockholder lists could
have an effect on increasing the rate of merger approvals. Finally, this Note suggests that implementation of DLS would not
have an effect on the number of stockholders who exercise their
appraisal rights.
Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Meyers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the
Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19
YALE J.L. & TECH. 334, 338 (2017).
2 Id. at 337.
3 Alan Cohn, Travis West & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain,
Smart Contracts, Parametric Insurance, And Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 273, 277 (2017).
1
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The magnitude of the issue of inaccurate stockholder ledgers
was illuminated in a recent Delaware case involving the assertion
of 49,164,415 facially valid settlement claims of a class of common
stockholders in Dole Food Company (Dole), when only 36,793,758
shares of common stock were on record in the class.4 In re Dole
involved a single-step merger in which the common stockholders
of Dole received $13.50 per share as consideration.5 The consideration was distributed to the stockholders of record on the Depository Trust Company’s (DTC’s) centralized ledger.6 DTC’s ledger
consists of the record owner of shares, not the beneficial owners.7 Consideration for the Dole merger was thus distributed to
the record holders listed on the centralized ledger, not the beneficial owners.8
A class of Dole common stockholders filed suit against Dole’s
fiduciaries and ultimately settled for $2.74 per share, plus interest.9 The court initially ordered that the settlement be allocated
through traditional claims methods, involving a settlement administrator who mails notices and claims to potential class members.10
When A.B. Data, the Settlement Administrator, received roughly
thirty-three percent more share claims than the class of calculated common stock actually held, the discrepancy was irreconcilable.11 Ultimately, the court granted the class counsel’s motion to
modify the allocation procedure to authorize settlement distribution
4 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017). Some of these claims were rendered “facially valid”
because claimants provided documentation of receipt of the merger consideration. Id. at *2. This is not an accurate validating document, however, because
those who received merger consideration were on the record November 1,
whereas, those who should have received merger consideration and this settlement were beneficial owners on November 4, the date of closing. Id. at *3.
5 Id. at *1.
6 Id.
7 Id. at *5. This means that during an initial public offering, shares are issued to DTC. Id. Then, DTC sells those shares to brokers and other intermediaries who subsequently sell the beneficial ownership rights of the shares to
individuals. Id. at *6. Beneficial ownership rights include the right to vote and
the right to receive dividends. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2011). DTC only records
the record owners from the first transaction on its centralized ledger, not the
later resale and trades of stock. In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *3.
8 Id.
9 Id. at *1.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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to be effectuated in the same manner as merger consideration
was distributed.12 The record owners were expected to distribute
both the consideration and the settlement amounts to the correct
beneficial owners.13 The problem in this case arose because these
record owners did not maintain accurate track of the identity of
the beneficial owners and therefore were unable to distribute both
the consideration and the settlement amount to the correct beneficial owners.14
The court noted that the scale of the inconsistency between
the class of common stockholders and those asserting their rights as
common stockholders (an approximately 13 million share discrepancy) is largely a product of the depository system.15 In this case,
DTC put a “chill” on the records of Dole at close of business on
November 1, 2013.16 The deal closed on November 4 and consideration was distributed then.17 But, in the three-day period between
“chilling” the records and closing, more than thirty-two million
shares of Dole common stock were traded, with no record on DTC’s
centralized ledger.18 The centralized ledger did not reflect the trades
in the days preceding closing.19 Therefore, both the record owners of shares on November 1, when DTC stopped tracking trading,
and the beneficial owners of shares on November 4, when the merger was effectuated, asserted their facially valid claims as members of the common stockholder class on the date of the merger.20
Under the current system, obtaining accurate records of beneficial
ownership is “not realistically achievable” because it would require
information from hundreds of brokers, banks, and their clients.21
Judge Laster posited that “distributed ledger technology offers a
potential technological solution (to the depository system) by
maintaining multiple, current copies of a single and comprehensive stock ownership ledger.”22
Id.
Id. at *3.
14 Id.
15 Id. at *4 n.1.
16 Id. at *3. A “chill” locks in the stockholder’s position on the ledger.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at *3.
20 Id.
21 Id. at *4.
22 Id. at *4 n.1.
12
13
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The problem of inaccurate tracking of stockholders extends
beyond affecting the settlement claim rights discussed in Dole.
The issue also impacts stockholder votes on mergers and, relatedly,
appraisal rights because they both involve stockholders asserting
ownership rights to vote, and be compensated for, their dissenting opinion.23 If stockholder ownership is not accurately recorded,
stockholders can lose the opportunity to effectively exercise their
statutorily guaranteed rights.24
Although Delaware law only requires corporations to maintain a list of record holders (not beneficial owners), blockchain
technology could offer a solution to tracking both types of ownership.25 Without the need for intermediaries to trade securities,
individuals will be free to trade both the record and beneficial
ownership easily.26 Distributed ledger trading can facilitate tracking of both record and beneficial ownership through peer-to-peer
transactions, all while maintaining multiple, current copies of a
single and comprehensive ledger.27
I. BLOCKCHAIN GENERALLY
Distributed ledgers utilize blockchain technology to facilitate
a secure, transparent, and immutable transaction in real-time.28
Joshua Klayman, Geoffrey Peck & Mark Wojciechowski, Why the Delaware Blockchain Initiative Matters to All Dealmakers, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/09/20/why-the-delaware-block
chain-initiative-matters-to-all-dealmakers/2/#6072ebc05f77 [http://perma.cc/FP
A6-668R]; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(a) (West 2018).
24 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 30,
2015) (both holding that beneficial owners can forfeit their appraisal rights
due to complexities in the depository securities trading system).
25 In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *5; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8207(a) (West 2018) (issuers should “treat the registered owner as the person
exclusively entitled to vote, receive notifications, and otherwise exercise all the
rights and powers of an owner”).
26 See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 181 (2017); infra Section III.A.
27 See In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1.; O’Shields, supra
note 26, at 181.
28 Harold Primm, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2016: VII.
Regulating the Blockchain Revolution: A Financial Industry Transformation,
36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 75, 80 (2016).
23
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Blockchain technology uses distributed ledgers to employ a decentralized database, which is replicated on each computer in
the network.29 Each member of the network maintains a ledger
detailing the transaction history amongst the parties within the
network.30 Every time a new transaction occurs, a new “block” is
added to the existing chain of transaction history.31 Because of
the decentralized feature of the database, this new “block” will
be recorded on all ledgers within the database.32
Transaction security is achieved through sophisticated cryptography, which ensures that one party in the database cannot
unilaterally alter the transaction history on a ledger.33 Further,
each ledger on the distributed database must reconcile with a majority of other ledgers before completing a transaction, making
fraudulent transactions nearly impossible.34
The successive “blocks” which create a chain bolster
transparency because blockchains provide a complete transaction history.35 Immutability is achieved through the validation
process; requiring a consensus among a majority of ledgers within a database to legitimize a transaction.36 This instantaneous
transaction validation is then recorded in real-time on each
ledger, adding a new “block” to the chain.37
II. BLOCKCHAIN & CORPORATE RECORD-KEEPING
Delaware corporate law confers beneficial ownership rights,
including voting rights, dividend rights, and the standing to sue
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(1) (2017).
Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technologies in
Securities Post-Trading: Revolution or evolution? 9, 17 (European Cent. Bank,
Occasional Paper No. 172, 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops
/ecbop172.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/SB9V-TG9J].
31 Primm, supra note 28, at 78.
32 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 9, 17.
33 Daniel DeConinck, Overstock Completes First Public Stock Issuance Using
Blockchain, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 416, 427 (2017).
34 Id.; M. Mark Heekin, A National Mortgage Notes Registry: America’s Immense Need for Transparency and Certainty in Mortgage Ownership and the
Right to Foreclose, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 67, 107–08 (2017).
35 DeConinck, supra note 33, at 427; Primm, supra note 28, at 78.
36 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 6, 12.
37 Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(1) (2017). For an explanation
on the technological inner workings of blockchain, see generally O’Shields,
supra note 26, at 180.
29
30
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for breach of fiduciary duties to the direct, beneficial owners of
shares.38 Voting rights are particularly important because, by voting, stockholders are afforded the opportunity to voice their individual opinions on corporate matters.39 But, under traditional
share trading methods, it is extremely difficult to track the true
beneficial owner of a share because of the multitude of intermediaries involved.40
When a public company conducts an Initial Public Offering
(IPO) to issue shares, a nominee of the Depository Trust Company (DTC) buys up most or all of the issued shares.41 Then, the
DTC sells the shares to institutional investors at a higher rate.42
Individuals or other security intermediaries then may buy the
shares from the institutional investors and later sell the stock
downstream on stock exchanges.43 Each time a share is “sold,”
the security entitlements to beneficial ownership are actually
assigned to the new buyer from the intermediary seller.44 The DTC
remains the record owner of the stock, and only records broker
ownership. When brokers and intermediaries sell shares, they do
not track the true beneficial owners.45 Instead, they track the assigned ownership rights on an aggregate basis, which inaccurately reflects the real individual owners.46 The inaccuracies of
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2011); Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of
Corporate Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-block
chain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-fi
nance/ [http://perma.cc/RR2B-A6RP].
39 Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the
Curious Turn Towards Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2082 (2010)
(detailing rights of stockholders to elect boards of directors, vote on mergers
and sale of substantially all of a corporation’s assets, vote to amend charter,
and add proposals to proxy ballots).
40 Stephen Fox, Recent Cases Demonstrate Need for Blockchain, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2017/08/08/recent-cases-demonstrate-need-for-blockchain/ [http://
perma.cc/S3RC-379U]; Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
41 Klayman et al., supra note 23.
42 Id.
43 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
44 Fox, supra note 40; id. at 38.
45 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
46 Id.
38
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tracking true beneficial owners are compounded by multiple levels
of intermediary intervention in the trading of a single share.47
This “depository system” can abridge important stockholder privileges, like voting and appraisal rights, due to the compounded
tracking inaccuracies.48
A. Corporate Record-Keeping Requirements
The problem of inaccurate records is significant because of
the statutory record-keeping requirements in each state.49 Corporations are required to maintain records of: articles of incorporation, amendments filed with the state, corporate bylaws, annual
reports, names and addresses of directors and officers, names and
addresses of stockholders, and meeting minutes.50
In Delaware, corporations are required to maintain a complete list (called a stock ledger)51 of stockholders entitled to vote,
in alphabetical order, including the address of each stockholder
and the number of shares registered to him.52 In addition, corporations must record transfers of stock in accordance with other
Id. A recent Delaware case highlights the magnitude of the inaccurate
tracking problem. In re Dole Food Co., Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL 2015
WL 5052214, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). For an in-depth discussion of
Dole and the stockholder tracking issue, see Klayman et al., supra note 23.
48 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholders Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1 (citing
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016)); In re Appraisal of
Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3–7 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015)
(holding that beneficial owners forfeit their appraisal rights due to the depository system).
49 Nellie Akalp, How to Keep Proper Corporate Records, ENTREPRENEUR
.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/287676# [http://
perma.cc/3UDG-XUSF]. This Note will focus on Delaware Law, as more than 50
percent of all publicly traded companies chose to incorporate in the state. JEFFERY
W. BULLOCK, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS,
2 (2013), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20 Annual%20Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WU7-F9HF].
50 Id.
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (West 2017) (“‘[S]tock ledger’ means one
or more records administered by or on behalf of the corporation in which the
names of all of the corporation’s stockholders of record, the address and number of shares registered in the name of each such stockholder, and all issuances and transfers of stock of the corporation are recorded.”).
52 Id. § 219(a).
47
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securities laws.53 Accurate stock ledgers are significant because
they facilitate ownership, voting, appraisal, and dividend rights
of stockholders.54
B. Increased Accuracy Using Blockchain
The Delaware Blockchain Initiative (DBI) advocated for the
amendment to Delaware Corporate Law to permit DLS in an effort
to solve the problem of inaccurate record-keeping, specifically the
inaccurate tracking of stockholders.55 DLS allow for precise tracking of share ownership because of the transaction-history recording
function of each “block” added to a blockchain.56 The Delaware
Court of Chancery has even pointed to distributed ledger technology
as a solution to the inaccurate stock ownership tracking problem.57
When an IPO is conducted using DLS, the Delaware Division of Corporations can cryptographically sign and transfer the
authorized share to the corporation.58 These original shares would
serve as the first “blocks” on the corporation’s stock ledger blockchain.59 Then, any subsequent transfers of shares are validated
by a consensus of a majority of the network’s participants.60 Once
validated, the transfer will be recorded as a new “block” and added
to the transaction history for that share.61 This process allows
for direct share ownership and a perfect record of those stockholders, in a format easily accessible to the corporation.62 Because
of the finite number of authorized shares, a perfect record of
those issued, and an accurate transaction history, DLS could solve
the problem of inaccurate stockholder lists.63
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 160 (West 2018); see DEL. CODE. ANN tit. 8 § 106
(governing the transfer of investment securities).
54 Klayman et al., supra note 23.
55 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
56 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 3, 6–7.
57 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843,
at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017) (“Distributed ledger technology offers a potential technological solution by maintaining multiple, current copies of a single and
comprehensive stock ownership ledger.”).
58 See Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
59 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08.
60 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 7.
61 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08.
62 See Fox, supra note 40; Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
63 See Fox, supra note 40; S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017).
53
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III. BLOCKCHAIN & STOCK TRADING
Blockchain technology can improve securities trading efficiencies by enabling a distributed ledger platform for secure,
transparent, and immutable trading transactions.64 For example, without the need for intermediaries to verify the validity of
a transaction with an unknown buyer or seller, trading can be
effectuated peer-to-peer instantaneously.65 By using blockchain
technology, a securities trader can be sure that the transaction
is both valid and unchangeable, due to the immutability characteristic of distributed ledgers.66 In addition, the transparency
provided by multiple ledgers tracking every transaction facilitates more trust in the security being traded, and less need for
asset verification.67 An individual can more efficiently buy or sell
securities using blockchain with the full confidence that the transaction is valid and unchangeable, without the use of an intermediary, thus decreasing transaction time and costs.68
A. Delaware’s Implementation of Blockchain Technology
Delaware was the first state to announce its support for
implementation of distributed ledger technology in securities
trading.69 Formed in May 2016, the DBI supported an amendment to Delaware Corporate Law to accommodate distributed
ledger offerings and trading of shares.70 In July 2017, Delaware
amended its Corporate Law to permit the use of blockchain
technology to create and maintain corporate records, including

See DeConinck, supra note 33, at 426.
See supra Part I.
66 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 10–11.
67 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08.
68 See infra Section III.A.
69 Marco A. Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware Blockchain Initiative, GLOBAL DEL. BLOG (June 10, 2016), https://global.delaware
.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distributed-ledger-based-share-ownership
-structure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/BRG9-4YFU].
70 Meri Weiss, Delaware Moves Toward Blockchain Technology, HARV. BUS.
SERV. BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/Delaware-moves
-toward-blockchain-technology/ [https://perma.cc/ABB3-HGVH].
64
65
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distributed ledger shares (DLS).71 These DLS are recorded and
transferred on a decentralized ledger.72
Corporations opting to incorporate using DLS can benefit
from the core efficiencies of blockchain technology by eliminating unnecessary intermediaries in the securities market and
accurately tracking share ownership.73 DLS can leverage the
two main innovations of blockchain technology: accurate tracking of transfers of property and direct property ownership transfers from peer-to-peer.74
Although Delaware is the first state to use blockchain
technology for securities trading, other states have begun efforts
to leverage blockchain efficiencies for other purposes. 75 Congress
S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017). This act is intended to provide
specific statutory authority for Delaware corporations to use networks of electronic
databases for the creation and maintenance of corporate records, including
the corporation’s stock ledger; “[the stock ledger] must enable a corporation to
prepare the list of stockholders specified in Sections 219 and 220 ... and, as
required by Section 159, it must record transfers of stock as governed by Article
8 of Subtitle I of Title 6.” Delaware Senate Bill 69 Summary, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/DE/bill/SB69/2017 [https://perma.cc/6PR8-MZV4].
72 See Weiss, supra note 70.
73 See Fox, supra note 40; Ryan Surujnath, Note, Off the Chain! A Guide to
Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk, 22
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 260 (2017) (“[A]t their core, blockchains are
about trust and transparency among unknown peers in the absence of mutually agreed upon intermediaries.”); Tinianow & Long, supra note 38.
74 See O’Shields, supra note 26, at 181.
75 Jeffrey Neuburger, Arizona Passes Groundbreaking Blockchain and
Smart Contract Law—State Blockchain Laws on the Rise, NEW MEDIA &
TECH. L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/04
/20/arizona-passes-groundbreaking-blockchain-and-smart-contract-law-state-block
chain-laws-on-the-rise/ [https://perma.cc/4D39-6MUB]; see, e.g., H.B. 2417, 53rd
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017) (clarifying the enforceability of “smart contracts”
and electronic signatures executed utilizing blockchain technology); H.B. 1481,
29th Leg. (Haw. 2017) (establishing a “working group” to advise on the use of
blockchain technology in identity and access management, healthcare, legal
services, financial services, manufacturing, and tourism); Legis. Doc. 950, 128th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017) (using blockchain technology in conjunction with paper
ballots in elections); S.B. 398 79th (Nev. 2017) (“recognizing blockchain technology as a type of electronic record for the purposes of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act”); H.868, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2016) (stating that under
the Vermont Rules of Evidence, blockchain-based records will be considered
“business records”); Illinois Department of Innovation & Technology, Illinois
Blockchain Initiative (created to explore innovations presented by Blockchain
71
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has even employed the Congressional Blockchain Caucus to explore
how blockchain can “improve identity management, asset tracking and ownership, healthcare records management, intellectual
property rights, and much more.”76 While federal law regulates
securities trading, state law governs corporations pursuant to
the internal affairs doctrine.77 Accordingly, individual states will
have to amend their corporate legislation to allow for blockchainenabled corporate record-keeping of stock ledgers.78
IV. ACCURATE STOCKHOLDER LISTS & MERGER APPROVALS
At common law, mergers and other business combinations
required a unanimous stockholder vote to approve the transaction.79
Through the evolution of state corporate law, statutory mergers
today can be effectuated with less than unanimous stockholder
approval.80 Under Delaware law, two or more corporations may
merge into a single surviving corporation, by way of a proper merger agreement.81 First, the Boards of Directors of each company
and distributed ledger technology), https://illinoisblockchain.tech/ [https://perma
.cc/J3BV-HSUT].
76 Congressmen Jared Polis & David Schweikert, Congressional Blockchain
Caucus, https://www.congressionalblockchaincaucus.com/ [https://perma.cc/AQ
P6-EAR7].
77 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Toward a Stakeholder Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1067, 1075, 1078 (2008) (defining the internal affairs doctrine as “a horizontal
choice-of-law rule that provides that the law of the state of incorporation governs
the relationship between the firm, its shareholders, and firm management.”).
78 See Akalp, supra note 49 (noting that states vary in their record-keeping
requirements).
79 Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) (“At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental
changes in the corporation”).
80 For a historical overview of the development of stockholder voting rights
on corporate combinations, see generally Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of
Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76
N.C. L. REV. 687, 695 (1998).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a) (West 2017). Note that not all statutory
mergers must be submitted to stockholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251(f)–(h) (West 2017) (proscribing the situations in which a Board of Directors
is not required to present the merger agreement to stockholder for approval). For
the purposes of this Note, “merger” refers to those business reorganizations
which require stockholder approval pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251
(West 2017).
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must adopt a resolution approving such agreement, which states
the material terms and effects of such a merger.82 Then, the
agreement must be submitted to the stockholders of both corporations at an annual or special meeting.83 It is significant to note
that notice of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting is sent
to those stockholders on the company’s stock ledger at least twenty
days before the meeting.84 The merger is approved if, at the meeting to consider the agreement, a majority of stockholders of outstanding stock in the corporation who are entitled to vote, vote
in favor of the merger.85
In addition to the right to vote on certain mergers, stockholders are also entitled to appraisal rights.86 Appraisal rights
are extended to those stockholders who: own shares on the date of
the vote, own the shares through the effective date of the business
reorganization, and did not vote in favor of the merger.87 Because
of the depository system, the record holder of shares who is recorded in the official stockholder list is usually not the beneficial
owner of the shares, entitled to dissenters’ appraisal rights.88 The
record owner of shares, DTS, will vote in bulk on the merger for
all of their recorded shares.89 DTS does not differentiate between
the individual stockholders votes because the shares are held in
“fungible bulk” among many others.90 This creates a problem
because in order to exercise appraisal rights, a stockholder must
Id. § 251(b). All resolutions should state the terms and conditions of the
merger, how the merger will be carried out, and what consideration will be
paid to the constituent stockholders. Id. § 251(b)(1)–(2), (5)–(6). For mergers,
resolutions must also state amendments to the certificate of incorporation. Id.
§ 251(b)(3). For consolidations, resolutions must include the certificate of
incorporation of the resulting corporation. Id. § 251(b)(4).
83 Id. § 251(c).
84 Id.
85 Id.; see Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract
and Corporate Law Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 577 (1999) (“Final shareholder approval concludes the approval stage and the mechanics of
the merger will then be implemented.”).
86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018).
87 Id.
88 Robert S. Reder & Stanley Onyeador, Delaware Chancery Disqualifies
Lead Petitioners in Dell Appraisal Who Inadvertently Voted “FOR” Management Buyout, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 279, 286 (2016).
89 Id.
90 Id.
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have voted against a merger.91 If the record holder votes shares in
bulk without determining which shares are for or against the
merger, a stockholder can forfeit their appraisal rights by “inadvertently voting in favor of the merger due to complexities created
by the depository system.”92
Under a new regime of blockchain facilitated peer-to-peer
stock trading, the issue of inaccurate stockholder votes on mergers
and inadvertent forfeiture of appraisal rights can be remedied.93
Stockholder votes are taken in real-time, by the true beneficial owners of stock.94 Approving stockholders can be sure that their vote is
counted, and dissenting stockholders will have accurate proof that
they voted against the reorganization.95 The effects of this timely,
more accurate system of stockholder voting could increase the rate
of merger approvals and make it easier to assert appraisal rights.
Current Delaware law requires that a merger agreement
be submitted to stockholders at least twenty days prior to the date
of the meeting to approve the merger.96 However, due to the high
volume of stock trading that occurs between announcement of a
merger, stockholder vote, and subsequently, the closing of the deal,
the stockholders who receive the agreement twenty days prior to
voting are not the same beneficial owners of the target stock twenty
days later.97 Because DLS allow for accurate tracking of beneficial
stockholders, those who acquire shares during the twenty-day
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018).
In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843,
at *11 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); see In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d
20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that the complexities created by the depository
system can force beneficial owners to forfeit appraisal rights).
93 In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *11 n.1.
94 See DeConinck, supra note 33, at 426–27; Primm, supra note 28, at 78–80.
95 See Reade Ryan & Mayme Donohue, Securities on Blockchain, 73 BUS.
LAWYER 85, 97–98 (2018) (explaining how securities traded on distributed
ledgers maintain a record of definitive ownership). If the definitive owners vote,
their voting record will be accurately recorded as well. Id. at 94, 100.
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017).
97 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *3 (thirty-two
million shares traded in the three days before closing of the merger); Isfandiyar
Shaheen, Stock Market Reaction to Acquisition Announcements Using an Event
Study Approach, FRANKLIN & MARSHALL C. DEP’T ECON. (May 5, 2006) (“Announcements of mergers and acquisitions immediately impact a target company’s stock price, as induced reaction in the stock market cause investors to
revise expectations about the company’s future profitability.”).
91
92
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pre-vote period should also be given the merger agreement. 98 In
addition, on the day of the vote, the true beneficial owners of the
shares will be able to express their opinion for or against the
merger agreement.99
This scenario, where the true post-announcement, preclosing beneficial owners of shares vote for a merger, will result
in the heightened probability that a merger is approved. Essentially, the market forces100 after a merger is announced that influence the voting behavior of stockholders are now reflected on an
accurate stockholder ledger.101 As discussed in-depth below, the
general market force is from stockholders who bought shares after
the merger announcement and support the consummation of that
merger.102 DLS allow these market forces to determine the outcome of the actual vote because the corporation will have access to
an accurate stockholder list on the day of the vote.103 This increased
approval rating can be explained by evaluating the three types
of voting stockholders whose ownership has been accurately tracked
in real time.104 The accurate stockholder list, coupled with the updated transaction history of shares, allows for the market forces
to have a real effect on stockholder voting.105
This Section will evaluate the expected voting behaviors
of three types of stockholders: those who owned target stock before
the merger announcement and plan to continue being stockholders
(“X stockholders”), those who bought target stock after the merger
announcement (“Y stockholders”), and those who owned target stock
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017).
See id.; supra Part IV.
100 “Market forces,” as referenced in this Note, refer to the trading behaviors of institutional investors who are interested enough to make informed trading
decisions. Jeffrey Manns & Rover Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1155 (2013). This Note does not predict the trading
behaviors of disinterested individual investors, who may be rationally apathetic.
Market forces in this Note further assume that DLS use a private blockchain
in which the stockholders cannot see the trades or votes of other stockholders.
101 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98 (explaining how securities
issued on a blockchain ledger give issuer almost real-time data as to the accurate
record holders of its securities).
102 See infra Section IV.D.
103 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98.
104 See id. at 98.
105 See id.; see also Fox, supra note 40.
98
99
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before the merger announcement but do not plan on remaining
as stockholders (“Z stockholders”). This Note presumes the efficient
market hypothesis in predicting security trading behaviors.106 “Economic theory broadly assumes that the semi-strong efficient market
hypothesis applies to stock prices. This well-established framework asserts that stock prices immediately incorporate all publicly
available information about the issuer which implies that the information ... is incorporated into the stock price on the trading day
of the disclosure.”107 The expected voting behaviors of X, Y, and Z
stockholders rely on this semi-strong version of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, meaning that their trading behaviors are based on incorporating the information of a merger announcement.108
A. X Stockholders
X stockholders were owners of the target company stock
prior to the merger announcement. The acquiring company offers a
premium in either cash or stock to be traded for the target stockholders’ shares.109 In response to a merger announcement, the
demand for target company shares increases, causing the stock
to trade at a premium on the market.110 Because X stockholders
have chosen to forgo the premium they could realize by selling on
the market, they are indicating a belief that the merger consideration is more valuable than the market premium offered.111 It
follows that these X stockholders will vote in favor of the merger
because they want to realize the benefits of forgoing the market
premium and actually receive the merger consideration.112
Efficient Market Hypothesis is especially relevant in the merger context
because institutional investors, “specialize in investing in merger target companies
and rapidly acquire ... target company shares after the merger announcement.”
Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1155.
107 Id. at 1147 n.8.
108 See id. at 1155.
109 See Shaheen, supra note 97, at 3–4, 27.
110 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1154.
111 See id. at 1160, 1170 (explaining that merger announcements have a
strong positive impact on target company share price, usually up to a price just
below the consideration to be paid in the merger).
112 See id. at 1147 (“Markets understand that the decision to merge appears
driven by the hope ... for greater potential returns for the combined company
and the target company’s shareholders’ desire for the takeover premium.”).
106

798 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:781
Another group of X stockholders (X’), may have forgone selling on the market because they believe that the value of the target
company’s stock without merging will be greater than both the
premium offered on the market and the merger consideration.113
Therefore, such group of X stockholders may vote against the merger to realize the highest value from their stock.114 However, due
to the influence of the Y stockholders explained below, it would
be irrational to be an X’ stockholder because the merger will most
likely be approved and such X’ stockholder would receive the consideration that such stockholder has already deemed insufficient.115
Because of this reality, stockholders with an X’ mentality will either
become normal X stockholders who vote in favor of the merger and
receive consideration, Z’ stockholders who plan to vote against the
merger and subsequently assert appraisal rights, or sell on the
market, losing the effect of their vote entirely.116
In summary, X stockholders are owners of the target company stock before the merger announcement.117 Due to their belief
that the merger consideration is superior to the premium market
price, they have foregone selling their shares.118 To receive the consideration, the merger must be approved and therefore, X stockholders will vote in favor of the merger.119
B. Y Stockholders
Y stockholders bought the target company stock after the
merger announcement. As discussed, in response to merger announcements, target stock demand increases and so does the
market price.120 Y stockholders paid a premium on the market
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 43 (3d ed.
2012) (explaining a valid reason to want a merger is that the sum of the whole is
worth more than the individual parts). X’ stockholders take the opposite view,
believing that the value of the individual company is worth more.
114 See, e.g., id.
115 See infra Sections IV.A–C.
116 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016).
117 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1154.
118 This belief is supported by the trend of target company share prices rising to a level just below the offered consideration to be paid in the merger.
See id. at 1160.
119 See id. at 1147 (explaining the target stockholder’s desire for the takeover
premium offered as consideration).
120 See id.
113
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for the target company stock, indicating that they think the merger consideration is more valuable than even the premium price
they paid for the stock itself.121 Because the Y stockholders chose
to become equity owners of the target company after the merger
is announced, they were necessarily called to action by the merger prospect itself.122 To gain value over the premium price paid,
these Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger to receive
the consideration.123
There may be some stockholders (Y’) who bought target company stock after the merger announcement but who do not want
the merger to be effectuated, signifying a belief that target stock
will be worth more if the target stays independent.124 Y’ stockholders may take the merger announcement as an indicator that
target stock is undervalued, and be willing to pay a premium to
realize a portion of that value, with the opportunity for it to increase
more.125 However, to capture the arbitrage spread, the merger
needs to be effectuated so the stockholder can be liquidated or given
more valuable stock as consideration.126 This means that a rational
Y’ stockholder will either sell to another eager Y stockholder
who wants to benefit from the merger consideration, or they will
See id. at 1155 (discussing the acquisition of target shares post-merger
announcement by hedge funds and institutional investors who specialize in
investing in target companies seeking to exploit arbitrage opportunity).
122 See id. at 1147.
123 See id.
124 Otherwise, Y’ stockholders would not have bought the target stock at
such a market premium without the intent to receive the takeover premium
consideration. Compare BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 46 (“[t]he successful
bidder typically pays a premium of 30–50 [percent] ... over the pre-bid market
price of the target’s stock.”), with Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160,
1170 (explaining that merger announcements have a strong positive impact on
target company share price, usually up to a price just below the consideration
to be paid in the merger). Z’ stockholders would be willing to pay this market
premium and forego the takeover premium. See Manns & Anderson, supra
note 100, at 1172–73.
125 But see id. at 1147 (explaining that the decision to merge is motivated
by an expectation of future potential returns of the combined company, not
the target individually).
126 See Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6. An arbitrage spread is the difference
between the consideration and the current market price. Investors seeking to
capture the spread must buy the target stock at a discount to the consideration
offered, and then liquidate those shares after the merger is effectuated. Id.
121
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vote in favor of the merger themselves, effectively acting as regular Y stockholders.127
In summary, Y stockholders bought target company stock
for a premium on the market after the merger is announced.128
Like X stockholders, Y stockholders believe that the merger consideration is superior to the premium market price.129 To receive
that superior consideration, the merger must be approved and
therefore Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger.130
C. Z Stockholders
Z stockholders owned target stock before the merger announcement, but do not want to continue as target stockholders.
Instead of selling their shares on the market for a premium, Z
stockholders hold onto their shares. This retention of shares
indicates a belief that either the merger consideration is worth
more than the premium market price, the value of the target stock
will be worth more than both the consideration and the market
premium if the company stays independent, or that the fair
market value of the stock will be worth more than the both the
consideration and the market premium.131 The latter group, Z’
stockholders, plan to assert appraisal rights and receive the fair
market value.
See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (expressing stockholder
desire for takeover premiums); Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6 (discussing capturing the arbitrage spread).
128 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147.
129 See id.; supra Section IV.B.
130 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (explaining the target
stockholder’s desire for the takeover premium offered as consideration).
131 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 46 (“[T]he successful bidder typically
pays a premium of 30–50 [percent] ... over the pre-bid market price of the
target’s stock.”); Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1170 (explaining that
merger announcements have a strong positive impact on target company share
price, usually up to a price just below the consideration to be paid in the merger);
David A. Katz, Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 27, 2014), https://corpgov.law.har
vard.edu/2014/03/27/shareholder-activism-in-the-ma-context/ [https://perma.cc
/YMR5-9L72] (discussing the high success rate of obtaining a higher price than
merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware in the past).
127
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Z stockholders who believe that the merger consideration
is worth more than the premium market price are effectively X
stockholders and will vote in favor of the merger.132
Z stockholders who believe that the value of the target stock
is worth more than the premium market price and the consideration if the company stays independent, will vote against the merger
to realize such value.133 Z stockholders will have to effectively evaluate the probability of the merger being denied in order to rationally decide to vote against the merger in hopes of higher realized
value as a stockholder of the independent target company.134 If
the Z stockholder concludes that the merger will not be effectuated, the decision to remain a target stockholder and vote against
the merger is justified.135 However, the risk of retaining the target company shares and losing out on the market premium is high,
because if the merger is approved, the Z stockholder will be left
to either accept the consideration or become a Z’ stockholder attempting to assert appraisal rights.136
These outcomes completely depend on the voting behavior
of the other stockholders.137 As discussed in the previous sections,
a majority of X and Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger
to realize the value they pursued originally.138 In light of the mass
quantity of market activity surrounding the announcement of a
merger, Z stockholders should be cautious due to the flux of Y
See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160; supra Section IV.A.
Otherwise, if they vote in favor of the merger, they will receive the consideration which Z stockholders have determined doesn’t maximize their stockholder value. This belief is contrary to the usual behavior of target stockholders
who desire a takeover premium paid as consideration. See Manns & Anderson,
supra note 100, at 1147.
134 See id. (explaining the target stockholder’s desire for the takeover premium offered as consideration).
135 If the merger is not effectuated, then target stockholders will not receive
the consideration, which is inadequate anyways according to Z stockholder
calculations. See id.
136 But see Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining
a higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware
in the past).
137 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (assuming the semistrong Efficient Market Hypothesis).
138 See supra Sections IV.A–C.
132
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stockholders entering the voting pool.139 The X and Y affirmative
voting pool will most likely outnumber the Z group of stockholders,
because any rational target stockholder owning shares on the day
of the merger will vote in favor of it.140 Therefore, Z stockholders
who vote against the merger will be left to take the consideration
or assert appraisal rights, neither outcome being ideal for their
calculation of maximization of value.141 Z stockholders who do not
want to become Z’ stockholders asserting appraisal rights, will be
forced to accept the merger consideration. If they are going to
accept the consideration, they are now effectively X stockholders
who will vote in favor of the merger.142
Z stockholders who believe that the fair market value of
target stock will be worth more than the consideration and the
market premium, Z’ stockholders, will vote against the merger
to realize this value.143 Stockholders are entitled to assert appraisal rights if they vote against the merger.144 The rational Z’
stockholder must believe that the time and effort necessary to
assert appraisal rights will yield more value than receiving the
consideration from the merger.145 Z’ stockholders have already
foregone realizing a gain from the market premium by not selling on the market before the merger is consummated.146 Appraisal
litigation is risky and can be very expensive.147 Therefore, the
See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholders Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017
WL 624843, at *8 (explaining that thirty-two million shares were traded in
the three days before closing of the merger).
140 Assuming rational stockholder action under the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the merger context. See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1155.
141 See id. at 1147 (expressing stockholder desire for takeover premiums);
Shaheen, supra note 97 (discussing capturing the arbitrage spread).
142 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160.
143 Fair market value as determined by a court in appraisal right perfection
litigation. Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining
a higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware
in the past).
144 See supra Part IV; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018).
145 See Katz, supra note 131.
146 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (discussing target
stockholder desire for the takeover premium reflected in the rising price of target
shares after a merger is announced).
147 See Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining a
higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware in
the past).
139
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pool of Z’ dissenting voters will be small, as most target stockholders will be looking for a guaranteed realization of value.148
In summary, Z and Z’ stockholders owned target stock before
the merger announcement and wish to remain target stockholders
after the merger vote. The only way to remain stockholders of an
independent target company is to vote against the merger.149
However, due to the high probability that large numbers of X
and Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger, and the low
probability that the fair market value awarded by a court realizes an actual gain, Z stockholders will also be incentivized to vote
in favor of the merger to receive the guaranteed consideration.150
D. Merger Approval
The ability of a target company to accurately track the
beneficial ownership of its shares will undoubtedly lead to more
precise voting by the true owners of stock, as reflected on a precise stock ledger.151 This accuracy allows market forces that
drive stockholder activity surrounding the announcement of a merger to become evident in the actual stockholder vote.152 To summarize, on the day of the vote, target stockholders are either
pre-announcement stockholders, who have not sold their shares,
or post-announcement share acquirers, who paid a premium to
See id. It is unclear whether high success rates were due to suits being
brought in only the most egregious of circumstances or whether courts are sympathetic to the dissenting stockholder asserting appraisal rights in general. Id.
In either case, it is still prohibitively expensive to initiate and prevail in appraisal
right perfection litigation. Id.
149 Otherwise, “if a quorum is present, the merger will be approved if more
votes are cast in favor of the plan of merger than against it.” BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 113, at 160.
150 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (expressing stockholder
desire for takeover premiums); Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6 (discussing capturing the arbitrage spread).
151 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL
624843, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at
100 (explaining how securities traded on distributed ledgers maintain a record of definitive ownership).
152 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *11 n.1
(explaining that thirty-two million shares were traded in the three days before
closing of the merger); Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98.
148
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become stockholders.153 Because the majority of rational actors in
both of those groups will be motivated to vote in favor of the
merger, more stockholder-approved mergers will be effectuated
using DLS.154
E. Exercise of Appraisal Rights
The problem enumerated in Dole extends to the loss of
appraisal rights for some stockholders due to inaccurate tracking of beneficial owners who voted against a merger.155 However,
by using DLS and therefore having an accurate stockholder ledger,
companies will be able to track which of the true beneficial owners
vote in favor or against the merger.156 In theory, this accurate
tracking of beneficial owner votes will make it easier to perfect
appraisal rights, as one of the required elements is proof of voting against the merger.157 But, practically this will not increase
the exercise of appraisal rights because of the market forces
discussed in the previous Section.158
On voting day, the rational stockholder will vote in favor
of the merger to receive the consideration.159 Z’ stockholders are
the only group which may vote against the merger to receive “fair
market value” through the appraisal process.160 But, as discussed,
it would be extremely risky to count on the time and expense of
appraisal litigation to be outweighed by such a large “fair market value” premium as to make the perfection of appraisal rights
worth it.161 Accordingly, appraisal rights litigation probably will
See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147.
See supra Sections IV.A–C.
155 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2015); In re
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 13,
2015) both holding that beneficial owners can forfeit their appraisal rights
due to complexities in the depository securities trading system).
156 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 100 (explaining how securities
traded on distributed ledgers maintain a record of definitive ownership). If
the definitive owners vote, their voting record will be accurately recorded as
well. See id. at 94.
157 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); Reder & Onyeador, supra
note 88, at 286.
158 See supra Part IV.
159 See Katz, supra note 131.
160 Id.
161 Id.
153
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not increase from historical levels as a consequence of accurate
stockholder ledgers.162
CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology has the potential to revolutionize the
securities trading world through DLS. One potential result of
leveraging blockchain for DLS is that corporations would be able
to maintain an up-to-date, accurate stockholder ledger at all times.
Further, this means that when corporations submit proxies to
stockholders to vote on, the true beneficial owners of the shares
will receive these proxies and their votes will be counted.163 This
innovation of accurate stockholder lists is significant to stockholder approved mergers because, in using DLS, the true owners
of shares will vote for or against the proposed transaction.164 This
Note posits that the market forces already in play surrounding
the announcement of a merger can be reflected in the vote using
accurate stockholder lists that are current up to the date of the
vote. Because these market forces can be reflected in the vote using
DLS, more stockholder approved mergers will be effectuated.165
In addition, increased accuracy of stockholder lists will not cause
an increase in the perfection of appraisal rights due to the prohibitive costs of such litigation.166

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); see Ryan & Donohue, supra
note 95, at 97.
164 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); see Ryan & Donohue, supra
note 95, at 97.
165 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(a) (West 2018); Katz, supra note 131.
166 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2015); Katz,
supra note 131.
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